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ABSTRACT
This research explores the balanced panel data to examine the
level of capital adjustment for major insured commercial banks
over the 2002-2018 period using a two-step GMM estimator. The
findings show that the speed of adjustment of the large insured
commercial banks is faster than that of non-financial companies.
The results contribute to a slower average adjustment pace of a
total capital ratio than the total risk-based capital and capital buf-
fer ratios. The adjustment of capital is faster in the post-crisis
period than during and before-crises era. The adequately capital-
ized banks adjust capital ratio faster than well-capitalized banks.
In contrast, the under-capitalized banks adjust the total risk-based
capital ratio and capital buffer ratio more quickly than that of
others. The low liquid banks needed a higher time to restore
equilibrium than high liquid banks. The results of this study have
economic significance for policy implications and future
regulations.
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1. Introduction
In the wake of the 2007-2009 financial crisis, regulators proposed significant revisions
to the rules for financial institutions, in particular by reshaping the current capital crite-
ria. The regulators tighten the re-designing frameworks for the required capital for
financial intuitions Bakkar et al. (2019). In the previous decade, the researchers have
been investigating the numerous aspects of the bank capital (De Jonghe & €Oztekin,
2015; Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2013; Dermine, 2015; DeYoung et al., 2018), particularly
for the assessment of capital on the performance (Abbas et al., 2019b; Ayaydin &
Karakaya, 2014; Berger & Bouwman, 2013), and on banks risk-taking (Allahrakha
et al., 2018; Balla & Rose, 2019; Bitar et al., 2016; Bougatef & Mgadmi, 2016).
This study aims to fill the gaps in the previous literature by addressing some ques-
tions. Are there variations in the average rate of capital adjustment, the total risk-
based capital ratio, and the capital buffer ratio? Are there differences in the pace of
change of the total capital ratio, total risk-based capital ratios, and capital buffer
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ratios during before and after the crisis? The speed of adjustment for the various cat-
egories of cross-sections is further distinguished.
The reason for this speed of adjustment is the most recent developments in Basel
III concerning the need for a higher capital sum for the resilience of the financial sys-
tem to meet unforeseen economic shocks. The emphasis of this study is on the capital
ratio calculated as equity to overall assets; the total risk-based capital ratio measured
as Tier 1 and Tier II equity to total risk-weighted assets Bakkar et al. (2019) and cap-
ital buffer ratio Jokipii and Milne (2011). The adjustment process is similar to previ-
ous studies (Bakkar et al., 2019; De Jonghe & €Oztekin, 2015; Lepetit et al., 2015).
The study uses a standard approach for partial adjustment to estimate the average
speed of adjustment Berger et al. (2008). This adjustment model undertakes that
every institution has a particular desired and required capital ratios. However, there
is very difficult to maintain desired ratios in a round number, and these ratios remain
different in friction because of the holding cost of capital. Therefore, randomly bank’s
actual capital ratios and target capital ratios always remain different Bakkar et al.
(2019). The actual and risk-based capital ratio considered as the weighted average of
a lagged number of respective capital ratios. In this situation, one can think and
expect the faster adjustment of the bank’s risk-based capital ratios than total capital
ratio. There may be a set of factors to use for the frictions of these capital ratios De
Jonghe and €Oztekin (2015). As we use the annual data for this analysis, there is pos-
sible to manipulate the different factors to reach the required results to avoid the
regulatory violations. The study used annual financial data of large commercial banks
as reported to FDIC1. Due to this reason, our analysis provides an average speed of
adjustment yearly. To investigate the differences in the rate of adjustment in capital
ratios is like Bakkar et al. (2019) and De Jonghe and €Oztekin (2015).
This study enriches the existing literature in several aspects. The analysis is critical
in providing different metrics that are responsible for influencing the adjustment of
varying capital ratios under current conditions. This study provides details for well,
adequately under-capitalized, high, and low liquid banks. The study is unique due to
the data period, advancement in regulations, technological transformations, and
financial integrations. This study contributes to the existing literature of banking for
the adjustment of total capital ratio, total risk-based capital ratio, and capital buffer
ratios. The significant contributions include a comparison of the speed of adjustment
for well, adequately, under, significantly undercapitalized, high liquid, and low liquid
large commercial banks. The next contribution of this work is to highlight the differ-
ences in the adjustment of total capital ratio, total risk-based capital ratio, and capital
buffer ratio due to crisis and regulations. The study provides insight for before-crisis,
during-crisis, and the post-crisis period of commercial banks. This study contributes
to compare the speed of adjustments for financial and non-financial.
After the first introductory section, the rest of the paper is structured in the fol-
lowing parts and sections. The second part reviews the literature on adjustment of
capital. The third section provides the partial adjustment model, data collection sour-
ces, sample selection and definitions, and measurement of variables used in the ana-
lysis. The fourth part of this paper describes the discussion of empirical findings. The
fifth section of this research contains the conclusions.
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2. Review of literature and hypothesis for capital adjustment ratios
This part provides the literature about the adjustment of capital. The early stud-
ies explore two types of analysis to adjust their capital ratios. The first analysis
investigates the adjustment of the size of the asset and the portfolio risk
required to achieve the RWA2 target. The second analysis examines the behav-
ior of banks to adjust the level of regulatory capital and RWA to meet the target
capital ratio Shimizu (2015). Previous studies evidence that Shrieves and Dahl
(1992) use the partial adjustment model to reveal the effect of regulations on
banks’ capital for commercial banks and Baranoff and Sager (2002) for insur-
ance firms. Hancock and Wilcox (1994) apply a two-component pattern for
adjustment purposes. Leary and Roberts (2005), empirically investigate and con-
clude that organizations actively rebalance their capital ratio in the presence of
adjustment costs.
Flannery and Rangan (2006) provide that, on average, firms remain one-third of
the deviation between target capital ratio and actual capital ratio in a year. They
favor that firms have their target capital ratio and try to achieve that possibly at a
lower cost. Drobetz and Wanzenried (2006) argue that firm-specific factors and
macroeconomic factors are influential for the adjustment of a firm’s debt and cap-
ital ratios. They conclude that during a reasonable margin of profit and under well
going economic situations, firms adjust their capital quickly. Huang and Ritter
(2009), deliver that firms use external financing to improve their capital ratio when
the cost of the new issue remains low. They find that a moderate pace with a half-
life of 3.7 years for the capital ratios to achieve their targeted equilibrium ratios.
Memmel and Raupach (2010), concluded the significant differences across financial
entities. They argue that the use of the liability side for the adjustment of capital is
more appropriate, whereas the tendency of capital adjustment is higher from the
assets side. They also argued that the banks adjust their capital ratio faster than
other origination. €Oztekin and Flannery (2012) argue that financial traditions and
legal laws significantly influence the adjustment of capital. They say that larger
organizations have lower transaction costs to adjust leverage. Francis and Osborne
(2012) employed a partial adjustment model to investigate the capitalization process
of firms.
De Jonghe and €Oztekin (2015) argue that banks primarily use equity to adjust their
capital instead of assets liquidation. They conclude that banks use earnings to extend
their assets. They find that banks make quick adjustments in their capital ratios,
where the regulations are stringent. Lepetit et al. (2015) show that in the absence of
excess control rights, most of the European banks boost their capital ratio by equity
without reducing lending. Cohen and Scatigna (2016), explore the adjustment channel
for capital ratios and find that the availability of a higher amount of capital makes
banks phase out the crises and earn higher profits by lending. The banks adjust their
capital more rapidly in a crisis period. Bakkar et al. (2019) conclude that banks adjust
their capital ratio faster than the regulatory capital ratio. They classify the sample
according to size and conclude that larger banks manage their capital ratio slower. In
contrast, they provide that riskier banks adjust their regulatory capital ratio faster
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than their leverage ratio. The hypotheses of the study can be described as follows,
taking into consideration the literature review:
Hhypothesis (H1): Large commercial banks adjust their risk-based capital ratios more
quickly than traditional capital ratios
Hypothesis (H2): Well-capitalized banks adjust their capital ratios more rapidly than
adequate and undercapitalized banks
Hypothesis (H3): High liquid banks adjust their capital ratios faster than low
liquid banks
Hypothesis (H4): The pace of capital ratio adjustment is higher in the post-crisis era than
before and during the crisis phase.
3. Data and partial adjustment model
3.1. Data
The population of this study is the large United States insured commercial banks.
As these banks comprise nearly half of the bank’s assets. Nonetheless, we have
large banks in our study, because the shareholders are the real owners, so capital
control is usually carried out at the centralized level. The bank-specific data were
collected from the consolidated financial statement like balance sheets, and
income statements reported to FDIC quarterly. The information for economic
indicators compiled from the World Bank, and data for economic freedom is
obtained from the heritage foundation established in 1996. In the data structure
of the present study, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)3 institutional
directory has used for the extraction of detailed information about the financial
system necessary to analyze the data in the long run period according to the
reports of FFIEC4 call/TFR and is updated quarterly by FDIC. The annual dataset
is consisted of financial institutions involved in the dataset and retrieved that
covers the long-term period ranging from 2002 to 2018. The sample of the study
is balanced to a comparable panel data containing insured commercial banks of
the US as described in the reports of FRSR5 and further, the assets based on a
consolidated form. In the reported number dated 31 December 2018, which was
published by FDIC, there were several banks in approximately 1806.
Nevertheless, the requirements for inclusion of the research sample units for suf-
ficient and reliable data collection based on the following parameters: the active
status of the banks mentioned on the published date must be current. There must
be no missed observations in the long-run duration for any specific variables of
analysis of at least two years. Banks ‘total assets must be higher than $300 mil-
lion, as of December 31, 2018. Following filtration of correctly followed parame-
ters, 899 banks were chosen for the sample size of the analysis. For a deeper
understanding and richness of observations, the sample is classified as well,
adequately under, significantly undercapitalized banks on the basis given by regu-
lators (see sample table for details). In comparison, there was a problem of nor-
mality in knowledge for all variables to be tiny at 1% and 99%. However, the list
of variables and their definitions provided in Table 9.
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Sample details table
3.2 Partial adjustment model
In the present situation of stringent regulations, banks usually maintain their desire
capital ratio. The financial institutions are bound to follow the regulator’s recommen-
dations. In case of violation, banks have to bear the cost as imposed by regulators.
The banks can function by maintaining the higher capital ratio as recommended by
or below a regulator. The circumstances where the cost of the capital improvement is
higher than the cost to bear while working at a lower than needed equity level. Such
a process is based on the trade-off between the cost of adjustment of capital and costs
to bear at a lower capital ratio Bakkar et al. (2019) and Flannery and Hankins (2013).
It has developed in practice in the previous studies to model capital ratio using a par-
tial adjustment process Flannery and Hankins (2013), Bakkar et al. (2019) and
Lemmon et al. (2008). In a capital adjustment model, a bank’s current capital is Xit ,
it is a weighted average of required capital ratio Xit, and the last period’s capital
ratio, Xit-1, as well as a random shock, e it similar to Bakkar et al. (2019) and De
Jonghe and €Oztekin (2015). The equation of the partial model is as under:
Xit ¼ cXitþ ð1cÞXit 1þ eit (1)
Here “it” represents cross-section (i), which is a bank in this case and period (t),
which is the year in this study. In general, each period, every bank closes a propor-
tion c of the difference between require and actual capital level. The lower the value
of Gamma (c), the more critical the capital ratio is, and the bank required a longer
time to achieve its required capital ratio after a shock occurred in an economy.
Therefore, the sign of c used as a gauge of capital adjustment, which is also called
the speed of adjustment for a bank and its complement (1- c) as the part of the cap-
ital that is inertial.
Bank’s target capital (capital ratio, risk-based capital ratio, and capital buffer ratio),
Xit, is unknown, and it is not a constant value, and it has varied concerning time
and working. This target capital ratio based on a linear trend of the lagged ratio of
capital, characteristics of bank, and time fixed factors like De Jonghe and €Oztekin
(2015) and Bakkar et al. (2019). The equation would be like this:
Xit ¼ bZit1 þ Vt þ ui (2)
To incorporate the bank characteristics, we follow the model of Bakkar et al.
(2019) they recently used the data of banks and found out the speed of adjustment of
Overall sample 899
Well-capitalized Banks 139 (Risk-based capital ratio > 10%)
Adequately-capitalized banks 103 (Risk-based capital ratio < 10% and ¼ 8%)
Undercapitalized Banks 241 (Risk-based capital ratio < 8% and ¼6%)
Significantly undercapitalized banks 416 (Risk-based capital ratio < 6%)
High liquid banks 477 (Based on Liquid Ratio)
Low liquid banks 452 (Based on Liquid Ratio)
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bank capital ratio and an earlier study of Gropp and Heider (2010) show the adjust-
ment of capital by using the data of non-financial firms. We use factors like Gropp
and Heider (2010), Bakkar et al. (2019), and Berger et al. (2008).
In this partial model of adjustment for capital ratios, we incorporated two fac-
tors of unobserved heterogeneity called time (Vt) and panel fixed effect ui. The
panel fixed effects unobserved heterogeneity includes the efficiency of manage-
ment, risk behavior, economic conditions, as well as of the country in which the
financial intuition is in operation, which is the USA in this case. The inclusion of
fixed effects in the capital adjustment model is supported by Bakkar et al. (2019),
Gropp and Heider (2010), and Huang and Ritter (2009). Putting the equation of




bZit1 þ Vt þ ˚IÞ þ 1 cð Þ Xit1 þ eit (3)
In the existence of a lagged value of the dependent variable, the use of ordinary
least square and fixed effects would provide biased estimators. Due to the biasedness
of OLS and fixed effects model we would estimate the coefficient of equation (3) by
applying a generalized method of moments (GMM) as suggested by Blundell and
Bond (1998) and used by Bakkar et al. (2019), and Flannery and Hankins (2013). In
a dynamic environment, GMM regulates the endogeneity of the lagged dependent
variable. GMM controls the problem of measurement error, reduces omitted bias
issues, and controls unobserved heterogeneity problems in panels. For this study, we
use the GMM two-stage system. The two-step GMM method is more effective than
the one-step GMM program, and the two-step GMM approach is capable of captur-
ing the highest estimator values. This model is to apply separately for capital ratio,
risk-based capital ratio, and capital buffer ratio.
4. Results and discussion
4.1. Descriptive statistics
Table 1A contains descriptive statistics, which provide information on the minimum,
maximum, average, standard deviations, and no observation of the proxies used in
the analysis. Capital ratios are the key emphasis and vector of concern. The overall
amount of the total capital ratio is 13.6%, the average value is 10.2%, and the min-
imum capital ratio is 7.8%. The maximum value of the average risk-based capital
ratio is 19.2%, with an average of 14.1% and a standard deviation of 1.8%. The capital
buffer ratio averages 5.9%, the median amount is 9.2%, and the standard deviation
is 2.1%.
4.2. Correlation matrix
Table 2 displays the matrix of correlations, which provides the sign of the relation
and connectivity between variables. The results show that the values are within the
appropriate range. The result shows that there is no issue with the high correlation
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between variables. The lower relationship between variables suggests that there is no
problem with high multicollinearity among the explanatory variables. The symbol of
factors indicates economic value and importance. For example, the results suggest
that profitability and the overall capital ratio are positively correlated, which implies
that an improvement in productivity contributes to an increase in the capital ratio.
Likewise, the strong link between credit risk and capital underpinned by the legisla-
tive theory that an increase in risk implies an increase in capital.
4.3. Overall sample findings
Table 3 provides data on the overall sample and the outcomes of well-capitalized
banks. Testing the misspecification that might result from the absence of crucial
Table 1A. Panel descriptive statistics.
Variable Obs Mean S.D P5 P25 P75
Capital Ratio (TCAPR) 14396 .102 .018 .078 .087 .115
Risk-based capital ratio (TRBCR) 14396 .141 .027 .108 .119 .159
Buffer capital ratio (BTRBCR) 14396 .059 .021 .033 .039 .079
Tier-I Capital ratio (TITA) 14396 0.09 .020 .072 .081 .104
Tier-I Risk-based ratio (TIRBCR) 14396 0.13 .020 .104 .108 .148
Tier-I Buffer ratio (BTIRBCR) 14396 0.07 .019 .043 .047 .087
Profitability (ROA) 14396 .01 .005 .001 .006 .013
Credit Risk (ALLGL) 14396 .014 .004 .008 .011 .017
Liquidity (LTOD) 14396 .822 .16 .501 .713 .938
Bank Efficiency (BE) 14396 3.048 1.756 .905 1.72 3.94
Income diversification (INDIV) 14396 .463 .098 .261 .407 .540
Market Power (MP) 14396 .139 .271 .022 0.027 .109
Asset diversification (AD) 14396 .58 .031 .518 .557 .606
Industrial development (INDD) 14396 .073 .075 .023 .028 .109
Bank SIZE 14396 13.554 .95 12.2 12.8 14.1
Financial freedom (FFINDX) 14396 78.235 8.565 70 70 90
Investment freedom (INVFINDX) 14396 73.824 5.009 70 70 80
Inflation rate 14396 1.92 .665 .759 1.54 2.06
Economic cycle (RGDPR) 14396 2.084 1.038 .291 1.67 2.81
Table 1B. A Yearly distribution of total capital ratio, risk-based capital ratio and buffer ratio.
Year TCAPR TRBCR BTRBCR
2002 0.0962 0.1358 0.0547
2003 0.0965 0.1371 0.0557
2004 0.0966 0.1354 0.0542
2005 0.0975 0.1345 0.0536
2006 0.0980 0.1332 0.0525
2007 0.0983 0.1309 0.0507
2008 0.0987 0.1307 0.0504
2009 0.0992 0.1367 0.0555
2010 0.1013 0.1440 0.0618
2011 0.1053 0.1495 0.0764
2012 0.1032 0.1507 0.0674
2013 0.1011 0.1509 0.0661
2014 0.0975 0.1509 0.0631
2015 0.0974 0.1449 0.0625
2016 0.9064 0.1439 0.0615
2017 0.0932 0.1461 0.0613
2018 0.0919 0.1446 0.0601
Source: Author’s Calculations by using Stata.
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factors. Often missing variables have a marginal impact as long as the results are set.
The findings show that there is no misspecification in the predicted tests. The find-
ings reported at the bottom of each table indicate that the instruments used are
accurate and that there is no issue with over-identification and second-order serial
autocorrelation.
The results show that the variables previously identified to affect capital ratios are
important and relevant to test the speed of adjustment for financial institutions, as
verified Gropp and Heider (2010). Applying the GMM two-step method estimator
Blundell and Bond (1998), we found that the average adjustment pace for the overall
sample is 20.2%, the total risk capital ratio is 26.7%, and the capital buffer ratio is
29%. The speed of adjustment suggests that the modification of the overall capital
ratio, the total risk-based capital ratio, and the capital buffer ratio are partial. It indi-
cates the difference between the actual and the target ratio, which is almost three
years and two years to eliminate the effect of shocks similar to Fama and French
(2002), and Lemmon et al. (2008). The period needed to reach the equilibrium
Table 3. A two-step system GMM results: Dependent variables: total capital ratio (TCAPR), total
risk-based capital ratio (TRBCR) and buffer capital ratio (BTRBCR).
Overall Sample Banks Well-capitalized Banks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES TCAPR TRBCR BTRBCR TCAPR TRBCR BTRBCR
Lagged. Dependent 0.798 0.733 0.710 0.739 0.696 0.670
(0.0312) (0.0402) (0.0363) (0.154) (0.111) (0.104)
Profitability 0.205 0.804 0.694 0.217 0.0876 0.434
(0.119) (0.221) (0.177) (0.407) (0.422) (0.388)
Credit Risk 0.224 0.664 0.553 0.359 0.640 0.465
(0.0285) (0.0496) (0.0412) (0.126) (0.122) (0.158)
Liquidity 0.0084 0.0120 0.0100 0.0048 0.0021 0.0007
(0.0013) (0.0025) (0.0018) (0.0029) (0.0031) (0.0033)
Bank Efficiency 0.0002 0.0007 0.0006 0.0005 0.0005 0.0006
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Income Diversification 0.0132 0.0357 0.0302 0.0026 0.0062 0.0088
(0.0041) (0.0078) (0.0062) (0.0025) (0.0049) (0.0043)
Market Power 0.0005 0.0004 0.0002 0.0003 0.0004 0.0014
(0.0007) (0.0012) (0.0009) (0.0019) (0.0025) (0.0033)
Assets Diversification 0.0165 0.0262 0.0248 0.0011 0.0153 0.0206
(0.0055) (0.0099) (0.0083) (0.0035) (0.0062) (0.0061)
Industry Development 0.0001 0.0012 0.0007 0.0075 0.0119 0.0132
(0.0017) (0.0028) (0.0024) (0.0096) (0.0081) (0.0088)
Bank Size 0.0002 0.0023 0.0019 0.0001 0.00038 0.0012
(0.00022) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0009)
Financial Freedom 0.0015 0.0012 0.0115 0.0155 0.0010 0.0027
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0009) (0.0009)
Investment Freedom 0.0005 0.0002 0.0007 0.0009 0.0007 0.0001
(0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Inflation Rate 0.0010 0.0001 0.0001 0.0012 0.0005 0.0004
(0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0014) (0.0010) (0.0009)
Economic cycle 0.0003 0.0002 0.0001 0.0003 0.0008 0.0012
(0.0001) (0.0018) (0.0001) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0005)
Constant 0.0050 0.0569 0.0335 0.0196 0.0257 0.00414
(0.00668) (0.0133) (0.00847) (0.0307) (0.0226) (0.0151)
Observations 14,369 14,369 14,369 2,224 2,224 2,224
Number of ids 899 899 899 139 139 139
AR (2) 0.156 0.521 506 0.137 0.755 0.934
Hansen Statistics 0.927 0.198 0.380 0.904 0.418 0.178
Standard errors in parentheses  p< 0.01,  p< 0.05,  p< 0.1.
Source: Author’s Calculations by using Stata.
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measured as a log of (0.5) with a log of (1-speed adjustment), similarly Berger et al.
(2008) and Gropp and Heider (2010). The findings justify the quick implementation
of regulators for capital restrictions to avoid unexpected shocks. The frequency of
adjustment for the overall capital ratio is 20.2% (1-coefficient of the lagged capital
ratio) which is higher than the total risk-based capital ratio and the capital-buffer
ratio; the results are compatible with the observations of Huang and Ritter (2009)
and Leary and Roberts (2005). The speed of adjustment shows that banks required
higher time to restore their equilibrium capital ratio than total risk-based capital and
capital buffer ratios, as concluded Bakkar et al. (2019).
4.4. Adjustment of capital before, during, and in the post-crisis period
In Table 7 panel-A, the speed of adjustment for the total capital ratio is 37.8%, like
Huang and Ritter (2009), the total risk-based capital ratio is 38.9%, and the capital
buffer ratio is 39.9% findings are similar to Fama and French (2002). The results are
consistent with the findings of Bakkar et al. (2019), Berger et al. (2008), and Lepetit
et al. (2015). In the post-crisis period, the significant factor of quick adjustment is the
profitability of banks, as argued by Flannery and Rangan (2006) and Huang and
Ritter (2009). In Table 7 panel-B during the crisis period, the speed of adjustment
and time to achieve equilibrium capital ratios are significantly different than before
and post-crisis periods. The banks use equity to adjust their capital ratios because, in
a crisis period, bank operations remain limited, and due to that, the contribution of
profits to boost capital ratios remains lower. The results show that during the crisis
period, banks try to adjust their total capital ratio faster than the total risk-based cap-
ital ratio and capital buffer ratio. The adjustment for the total capital ratio is 34.2%
Flannery and Rangan (2006), which is greater than the total risk-based capital ratio
and capital buffer ratio 19.6% and 29.7%, respectively Fama and French (2002). In a
Table 7 before-crisis, results show that banks’ speed of adjustment for the total capital
ratio is lower than the total risk-based capital ratio and capital buffer ratio.
4.5. Adjustment of capital ratios for well, adequately, under, significantly
undercapitalized banks
In Table 3, the well-capitalized adjustment speed of banks is stated to be 26.1% lower
than the total risk-based capital and capital buffer ratio of 30.4% and 33% respectively
similar to Berger et al. (2008), De Jonghe and €Oztekin (2015) and Bakkar et al.
(2019). Well-capitalized banks adjust their total risk-based capital ratio, capital buffer
ratios faster than the total capital ratio. In Table 4, the results of adequately capital-
ized banks show that the speed of adjustment for the total capital ratio is 36.6%,
which is higher than the total risk-based capital ratio of 23.5% and capital buffer ratio
21.8% similar to Flannery and Rangan (2006). In contrast, the rate of the total risk-
based capital ratio is consistent with Fama and French (2002) and Huang and Ritter
(2009). The results explore that adequately banks take 1.5 years to achieve total capital
ratio on equilibrium after a financial shock, as reported by Kayhan and Titman
(2007). In contrast, the total risk-based capital ratio and capital buffer ratio required
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2.6 and 2.8 years to achieve equilibrium findings are similar to Leary and Roberts
(2005), Flannery and Rangan (2006), and Huang and Ritter (2009). In Table 5 repre-
sents the results that undercapitalized banks increase their capital significantly, and
managers remain busy to secure the desired capital level De Jonghe and €Oztekin
(2015). The results show that the adjustment of the total risk-based capital ratio is
37.3%, which is faster than the total capital ratio of 17.8%. These results indicate that
undercapitalized banks are more fixable to adjust their regulatory capital before than
total capital ratio. The total capital ratio required 3.5 years, similar to Huang and
Ritter (2009), to achieve their desired level after an economic shock. The undercapi-
talized banks remain tight to adjust their capital ratios due to their operations. In
Table 5, shows the adjustment of significantly undercapitalized banks total capital
ratios 21.6%, which is lower than total risk-based capital ratio and capital buffer ratio
of 23.3% and 22.9%. The significantly undercapitalized banks required greater period
to achieve their equilibrium capital ratios than undercapitalized banks; the outcomes
are similar to Huang and Ritter (2009) and Flannery and Rangan (2006).
Table 4. A two-step system GMM results: Dependent variables: total capital ratio (TCAPR), total
risk-based capital ratio (TRBCR) and buffer capital ratio (BTRBCR).
Adequately-capitalized Banks
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES TCAPR TRBCR BTRBCR
Lagged. Dependent 0.634 0.765 0.782
(0.132) (0.0709) (0.114)
Profitability 0.0804 0.379 0.158
(0.533) (0.521) (0.523)
Credit Risk 0.330 0.812 0.647
(0.181) (0.150) (0.168)
Liquidity 0.0074 0.0015 0.0022
(0.0044) (0.0031) (0.0033)
Bank Efficiency 0.0004 0.0002 0.0001
(0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Income Diversification 0.0051 0.0015 0.0005
(0.0048) (0.0033) (0.0041)
Market Power 0.0038 0.0002 0.0006
(0.0046) (0.0029) (0.0025)
Assets Diversification 0.0112 0.0045 0.0070
(0.0088) (0.0048) (0.0052)
Industry Development 0.0082 0.0036 0.0026
(0.0012) (0.0005) (0.0004)
Bank Size 0.0017 0.0015 0.0013
(0.0009) (0.0006) (0.0006)
Financial Freedom 0.0004 0.0009 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0009) (0.0001)
Investment Freedom 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Inflation Rate 0.0005 0.0023 0.0021
(0.0013) (0.0011) (0.0011)
Economic cycle 0.0007 0.0011 0.0011
(0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Constant 0.0671 0.0378 0.0404
(0.0298) (0.0237) (0.0266)
Observations 1,649 1,649 1,649
Number of ids 104 104 104
AR (2) 0.724 0.699 0.703
Hansen Statistics 0.823 0.157 0.110
Standard errors in parentheses p< 0.01,  p< 0.05,  p< 0.1.
Source: Author’s Calculations by using Stata.
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4.6. Adjustment of capital ratios for high liquid and low liquid
commercial banks
In Table 6, results show that the speed of adjustment of the total capital ratio is
23.6%, which means high liquid banks required 2.6 years to restore equilibrium as
reported by Fama and French (2002) after an economic shock. The high liquid banks
are more concerned about adjusting their total risk-based capital ratio and capital
buffer ratio. The findings are in line with Memmel and Raupach (2010) and Huang
and Ritter (2009). In Table 6 shows that adjustment for the low liquid total capital
ratio is 17.%, which is lower than the high liquid banks’ total capital ratio this rate is
consistent with the findings of Fama and French (2002). The speed of adjustment for
total risk-based capital ratio and capital buffer ratio is 22.4% and 25.7% that is similar
to Leary and Roberts (2005). The findings indicate that low liquid banks needed a
lower time to adjust the total risk-based capital ratio and capital buffer ratio than
high liquid banks.
Table 5. A two-step system GMM results: Dependent variables: total capital ratio (TCAPR), total
risk-based capital ratio (TRBCR) and buffer capital ratio (BTRBCR).
Undercapitalized Banks Significantly Undercapitalized Banks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES TCAPR TRBCR BTRBCR TCAPR TRBCR BTRBCR
Lagged. Dependent 0.822 0.627 0.653 0.784 0.767 0.771
(0.119) (0.0554) (0.0678) (0.0646) (0.0492) (0.0532)
Profitability 0.0649 0.521 0.798 0.0879 0.344 0.811
(0.353) (0.278) (0.342) (0.317) (0.146) (0.270)
Credit Risk 0.390 0.740 0.761 0.0487 0.526 0.692
(0.0987) (0.0753) (0.0912) (0.103) (0.0553) (0.0870)
Liquidity 0.0037 0.0035 0.0017 0.0065 0.0009 0.0022
(0.0019) (0.0018) (0.0021) (0.0020) (0.0009) (0.0013)
Bank Efficiency 0.0008 0.0002 0.0005 0.0002 0.0001 0.0003
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Income Diversification 0.0025 0.0073 0.0113 0.0087 0.0034 0.0088
(0.0046) (0.0029) (0.0040) (0.0026) (0.0014) (0.0024)
Market Power 0.0014 0.0013 0.0023 0.0007 0.0002 0.0004
(0.0006) (0.0010) (0.0023) (0.0010) (0.0003) (0.0005)
Assets Diversification 0.00269 0.00376 0.00433 0.00750 0.00212 0.00540
(0.0046) (0.0029) (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0022) (0.0036)
Industry Development 0.0243 0.0029 0.0019 0.0037 0.00059 0.0021
(0.0119) (0.0059) (0.0063) (0.0049) (0.0011) (0.0021)
Bank Size 0.0007 0.0006 0.0006 0.0021 0.0037 0.0024
(0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Financial Freedom 0.0001 0.0006 0.0004 0.0003 0.0005 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0003) (0.0006)
Investment Freedom 0.0008 0.0001 0.0008 0.0002 0.0006 0.0003
(0.0001) (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0004) (0.0008)
Inflation Rate 0.0006 0.0011 0.0018 0.0005 0.0003 0.0023
(0.0009) (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0003) (0.0006)
Economic cycle 0.0008 0.0007 0.0008 0.0013 0.0001 0.0003
(0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0004)
Constant 0.0014 0.0328 0.0245 0.0063 0.0091 0.0198
(0.0153) (0.0147) (0.0155) (0.0137) (0.0104) (0.0110)
Observations 3,950 3,950 3,950 6,848 6,848 6,848
Number of ids 247 247 247 409 409 409
AR (2) 0.240 0.809 0.945 0.215 0.877 0.991
Hansen Statistics 0.620 0.504 0.320 0.860 0.231 0.941
Standard errors in parentheses p< 0.01,  p< 0.05,  p< 0.1.
Source: Author’s Calculations by using Stata.
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4.7. Robustness check
In the first round, we test the speed of adjustment of total capital ratio and risk-based
capital ratio for the overall sample. Then we extended out the analysis with the inclu-
sion of different categories of banks. In each case, we use capital buffer to test the
robustness of risk-based capital ratio, and in most cases, results are robust. The find-
ings indicate that the capital buffer ratio remains consistent in each case, which pro-
vides confidence about the robustness of results. In the next simulations for
robustness check, we use tier-I capital ratio, tier-I risk-based capital ratio, and tier-
one buffer ratio. Each capital measure is replaced with base capital measures for all
the categories of banks. Theoretically, there would be a slow pace to attain the core
capital ratios due to the higher cost of equity issues. Table 8 panel-A reports the
results for the overall sample with and without subordinated debts. Table 8 panel-B
contains the findings of well-capitalized banks and adequately capitalized banks. The
findings are in support of the main results of overall, well-capitalized, and adequately
capitalized banks with minor variation due to the importance of core capital ratios.
Table 6. A two-step system GMM results: Dependent variables: total capital ratio (TCAPR), total
risk-based capital ratio (TRBCR) and buffer capital ratio (BTRBCR).
High Liquid Banks Low Liquid Banks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES TCAPR TRBCR BTRBCR TCAPR TRBCR BTRBCR
Lagged. Dependent 0.764 0.635 0.724 0.830 0.780 0.743
(0.0786) (0.0531) (0.0487) (0.0657) (0.0550) (0.0555)
Constant 0.0371 0.0513 0.0621 0.0005 0.0049 0.0127
(0.0182) (0.0185) (0.0140) (0.0123) (0.0122) (0.0115)
Observations 7,233 7,233 7,233 7,520 7,520 7,520
Number of id 453 453 453 446 446 446
AR (2) 0.170 0.833 0.418 0.134 0.394 0.483
Hansen Statistics 0.566 0.129 0.940 0.270 0.213 0.431
Standard errors in parentheses  p< 0.01,  p< 0.05,  p< 0.1.
Source: Author’s Calculations by using Stata.
Table 7. A two-step system GMM results: Dependent variables: total capital ratio (TCAPR), total
risk-based capital ratio (TRBCR) and buffer capital ratio (BTRBCR).
Post-Crisis Periods Results Before-Crisis Period Results
Panel-A (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES TCAPR TRBCR BTRBCR TCAPR TRBCR BTRBCR
Lagged. Dependent 0.622 0.611 0.601 0.483 0.530 0.629
(0.144) (0.0503) (0.0484) (0.0702) (0.0682) (0.226)
Observations 7,384 7,384 7,384 3,692 3,692 3,692
Number of ids 899 899 899 899 899 899
AR (2) 0.662 0.471 0.350 0.236 0.472 0.694
Hansen Statistics 0.579 0.372 390 0.183 0.134 0.109
Panel-B During-Crisis Period Results
Lagged. Dependent 0.658 0.804 0.703
(0.0825) (0.0681) (0.3411)
Observations 1,847 1,847 1,847
Number of ids 899 899 899
No. of Instruments 17 17 17
AR (2) 0.123 0.234 0.341
Standard errors in parentheses  p< 0.01,  p< 0.05,  p< 0.1.
Source: Author’s Calculations by using Stata.
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Table 9 panel-A represents the results of high liquid banks, and panel-B contains the
findings of low liquid banks. The results are as per the expectations, and there is no
significant difference with baseline findings of the high and low liquid banks. Due to
the limitation of space, only relevant results are reported. Besides, we estimate the dif-
ferent regression that is not reported, and conclusions remain similar.
5. Conclusion
In this study, we explore how large insured commercial banks adjust their capital
ratios to attain their required levels by the two-step GMM method for a period rang-
ing from 2002 to 2018. This study concludes that the average adjustment pace for the
Table 8. A two-step system GMM results: Dependent variables: Tier one capital ratio (TITA), Tier I
risk-based ratio (TIRBCR) and Tier-I buffer ratio (BTIRBCR).
Overall Sample Banks Effect of Sub-ordinated debts
Panel-A (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES TITA TIRBCR BTIRBCR TITA TIRBCR BTIRBCR
Lagged. Dependent 0.850 0.795 0.768 0.819 0.749 0.742
(0.0318) (0.0279) (0.0350) (0.0496) (0.0310) (0.222)
Observations 14,369 14,369 14,369 2,224 2,224 2,224
Number of id 899 899 899 139 139 139
AR (2) 0.910 0.342 0.397 0.650 0.512 0.709
Hansen value 0.061 0.123 0.330 0.189 0.174 0.508
Panel-B Well-capitalized Banks Adequately-capitalized Banks
Lagged. Dependent 0.759 0.729 0.642 0.872 0.855 0.807
(0.0596) (0.0610) (0.122) (0.130) (0.101) (0.118)
Observations 2,224 2,224 2,224 1,633 1,633 1,633
Number of id 139 139 139 103 103 103
AR (2) 0.750 0.912 0.709 0.556 0.330 0.311
Hansen value 0.289 0.074 0.608 0.916 0.318 0.332
Standard errors in parentheses  p< 0.01,  p< 0.05,  p< 0.1.
Source: Author’s Calculations by using Stata.
Table 9. A two-step system GMM results: Dependent variables: Tier one capital ratio (TITA), Tier I
risk-based ratio (TIRBCR) and Tier-I buffer ratio (BTIRBCR).
Undercapitalized Banks Significantly Undercapitalized Banks
Panel-A (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES TITA TIRBCR BTIRBCR TITA TIRBCR BTIRBCR
Lagged. Dependent 0.879 0.807 0.739 0.823 0.805 0.805
(0.0473) (0.0451) (0.0519) (0.0400) (0.0412) (0.0436)
Observations 3,855 3,855 3,855 6,576 6,576 6,576
Number of id 241 241 241 411 411 411
AR (2) 0.407 0.814 0.969 0.422 0.195 0.257
Hansen value 0.139 0.140 0.150 0.235 0.632 0.502
Panel-B High Liquid Banks Low Liquid Banks
Lagged. Dependent 0.815 0.754 0.757 0.818 0.789 0.759
(0.0397) (0.0365) (0.0425) (0.0411) (0.0373) (0.0498)
Observations 7,137 7,137 7,137 7,232 7,232 7,232
Number of id 447 447 447 452 452 452
AR (2) 0.670 0.631 0.995 0.248 0.212 0.310
Hansen value 0.341 0.245 0.430 0.190 0.065 0.132
Standard errors in parentheses p< 0.01,  p< 0.05,  p< 0.1.
Source: Author’s Calculations by using Stata.
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total capital ratio is 20.2%, the total risk-based capital ratio is 26.7%, and the capital
buffer ratio is 29.0%. The adjustment pace indicates that the adjustment of the total
capital ratio, the total risk-based capital ratio, and the capital buffer ratio is partial
and expresses the difference between the actual and the target ratio approximately
three to two years to reduce the impact of shocks. In such a situation, banks may
increase their capital by readjusting their risky assets. It is also suggested that a bank
can boost its target capital ratios to cut its dividend payments and increase retained
earnings. The speed of adjustment and time required to achieve equilibrium capital
ratios were significantly different in the crisis-era than those of befoore and after cri-
sis periods. Banks use equity to adjust their capital ratios because, in crisis banks,
operations remain limited, and, as a result, the contribution of profits to boosting
capital ratios suffers.
The well-capitalized banks change the total risk-based capital ratio and capital buf-
fer ratios more rapidly than the total capital ratio. The adequately capitalized banks
adjust total capital ratios by issuing new shares and adjusting the balance sheet assets
side of the portfolio in specific risk-weighted securities. Under-capitalized banks are
more fixable than the total capital ratio to adjust their regulatory capital ahead. These
results show economic worth in the sense that undercapitalized banks primarily
adjust the required ratio of capital to avoid the regulatory cost. The undercapitalized
banks remain tight to adjust capital ratios due to operations. The significantly under-
capitalized insured banks required a higher period to achieve their equilibrium capital
ratios than undercapitalized banks. The high liquid banks are more concerned about
adjusting their total risk-based capital ratio and capital buffer ratio. The speed of
adjustment of capital is higher for the high liquid banks than the low liquid total cap-
ital ratio. The findings of this study contribute to the adjustment of bank capital
ratios and have significant guidelines for regulators. The influence in our sample may
Table 10. Names and Measurements of Variables.
Name of Variable Measurement of Variables
Total Capital Ratio (TCAPR) Total Equity to Total Assets (Lee & Hsieh, 2013)
Total Risk-Based Capital Ratio (TRBCR) Tier I Plus Tier II to Risk-Weighted Assets (Guidara et al., 2013)
Capital Buffer Ratio (BTRBCR) Actual Capital Ratio less 8% (Guidara et al., 2013), (Jokipii & Milne, 2011)
Tier I Capital ratio (TITA) Tier I equity to Total Assets (Bitar et al., 2018)
Tier I Risk-based capital ratio (TIRBCR) Tier I equity to Risk-Weighted Assets (Abbas et al., 2019a)
Tier I buffer ratio (BTIRBCR) Tier I Capital ratio less 6% (Abbas et al., 2019a)
Profitability (ROA) Net Income to Total Assets (Sufian & Habibullah, 2010)
Credit Risk (ALLGL) Allowance for Loan Losses to Gross Loans (Lee & Hsieh, 2013)
Liquidity (LTOD) Loans to Deposits
Bank Efficiency (BE) Overhead to Revenue (Bitar et al., 2016)
Income Diversification (INDIV) Non-interest income to gross revenue (Shim, 2013)
Market Power (MP) Deposits to Industrial Assets (Bitar et al., 2016)
Assets Diversification (AD) 1  ((CLOANi/, tEAi, t)2þ (BLOANi,/tEAi,t)2þ (SECi,/tEAi,t)2þ
OTHERAi,/tEAi,t)2)
Industrial Development (INDD) Total Assets of Bank to Total Industrial Assets
Bank Size Natural Log of Total Assets (Lee & Hsieh, 2013)
Investment Freedom (INVFD) Investment freedom is taken from the Heritage Foundation (2018)
(Sufian & Habibullah, 2010)
Financial Freedom (FFD) Financial freedom is taken from the Heritage Foundation (2018) (Sufian &
Habibullah, 2010)
Inflation Rate Annual change in Consumer Price Index (Lee & Hsieh, 2013)
Economic cycle (RGDPR) Growth in the real gross domestic product (Lee & Hsieh, 2013)
Source: Author’s Calculations by using Stata.
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be limited as we focus on large insured commercial banks of the USA for which
the institutional setting is homogeneous. However, we remain restricted due to the
limitations of time and cost to investigate the investment banks, cooperative banks,
and saving banks. Furthermore, researchers may use the data for other categories of
banks for deeper insights.
Notes
1. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation for detail, https://www.fdic.gov/
2. Risk-weighted assets
3. https://research2.fdic.gov/bankfind/
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